Indiana Law Journal
Volume 18

Issue 2

Winter 1943

Separability Clauses

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
(1943) "Separability Clauses," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 18 : Iss. 2 , Article 11.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol18/iss2/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Article 11

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

involved, the real issue is whether or not a general law could be made
applicable, and this problem is virtually ignored. The Court contents
itself with saying that the act is invalid because the bases of the
classification are arbitrary. It is unfortunate that the connection
between this fact and the problem of whether a general law could
be made applicable was not clearly shown.
However, it is submitted that the result in the present case is a
correct one. As the Court said, the classification was arbitrary, i.e.,
it had no connection with the purpose of the act. Therefore, the
classification could be destroyed without preventing or hindering accomplishment of the act's purpose. If this is true, it seems clear that
a general law could be made applicable, and the act contravenes Section 23.

LEGISLATION
SEPARABILITY CLAUSES
A statute deferred the time for election of all officers of cities
and school cities, but exempted first class cities from its operation.
It contained a separability clause providing that if any part of the
act should be declared invalid, such decision would not invalidate the
remainder. Held, that the classification was unreasonable and special
legislation,' and that the exemption alone could not be elided, so
2
the entire act is unconstitutional.
To determine whether an entire act should be declared void in toto
or whether the objectionable exemption could be stricken, courts attempt to determine the legislative intent.3 Rules of interpretation declare that: (1) if a construction can be given the statute which will
not render it unconstitutional, that construction should be adopted; 4
1.
2.

3.

4.

See note (1942) 18 Ind. L.J.
Ettinger et al. v. Studevant, Hale et al. v. Dice, Ind., 38
N. 1,,. (2d) 1000 (1942). As originally submitted the bill was of
uniform operation over the entire state. The original bill was
referred to a committee, and there the exception and the separability clause were added contemporaneously. See Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1940) § 29-1813 et seq.
Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U.S. 90 (1886); State ex rel. Collett
v. Gorby, 122 Ind. 17, 23 N.E. 678 (1890); Kelley v. Ohio, 6 Ohio
S. 269 (1856); accord, State ex rel. Monnett v. Baker, 50 Ohio 1,
44 N.E. 516 (1896); State ex rel. Brown v. Honey, 190 Wis. 285,
208 N.W. 591 (1926); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McCormack,
174 Tenn. 327, 125 S.W. (2d) 151 (1939). There has been much
criticism of the doctrine of "legislative intent," but this seems
to be the best instrument for interpretation of statutes when
liberally applied in view of a thorough and critical analysis of
the factual situation. The "legislative intent" is not a tangible, easily
determined thing, but is a device which may well be compared
to that of the "reasonable man" in the law of negligence. Horack,
In the Name of Legislative Intention (1932) 38 W. Va. L. Q. 119.
Taggart v. Claypool, 145 Ind. 590, 44 N.E. 18 (1896); City of
Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30, 36 N.E. 857 (1893) (overruled
by principal case); Weco Products v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis.
474, 274 N.W. 426 (1937).
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(2) that courts should avoid judicial legislation, 5 and thus, if the
exception is important,6 or is closely interrelated with the remainder,7
the entire act will be declared invalid.
The courts look to whether elision of the unconstitutional provision will limit or broaden the scope of the act.8 Striking out an objectionable exception generally broadens the scope, 9 so in such case
the entire act is declared void for the reason that since the legislature
specifically exempted certain classes from the operation of the act,
they obviously did not intend that that class should be included by
action of the court.' 0 This result usually obtains where the statute
imposes a criminal penalty,1 ' where the exception was the purpose
5.

State ex rel. Wilmat v. Buckley, 60 Ohio 273, 54 N.E. 272 (1889);
see Kapaun v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 64 S.D. 635, 638,
269 N.W. 564, 566 (1936).
6. Griffin v. State, 119 Ind. 520, 22 N.E. 7 (1889); State ex rel.
Law v. Bland, 121 Ind. 514, 23 N.E. 511 (1889); Low v. Rees
Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 59 N.W. 362 (1892) ; Buckhaltz v. State,
16 Lea 71 (Tenn. 1885); State ex rel. La Valley v. Board of Sauk
County, 62 Wis. 376, 22 N.W. 572 (1885).
7. State v. Neveau, 237 Wis. 85, 294 N.W. 796 (1940) (preserving
act would have entailed complete revision of the attempted code);
Caldwell v. State, 187 Ind. 617, 119 N.E. 999 (1918); Board of
Comm. County of Johnson v. Johnson, 173 Ind. 76, 89 N.E. 590
(1909); Sheldon v. Hayne, 261 Ill. 222, 103 N.E. 1021 (1913);
State v. Nash, 97 N.C. 514, 2 S.E. 645 (1887).
8. State v. Inland Empire Refineries Inc., 3 Wash. (2d) 651, 101
P. (2d) 975 (1940) (disregarded separability clause because elision of exception would have broadened scope of act); Natha v.
Spokane Co., 35 Wash. 26. 76 Pac. 521 (1904); see Wilkinson v.
Stiles, 200 Ala. 279, 281, 76 So. 45, 46 (1917). Before separability clauses, when express exceptions were invalid the whole
act was void " . . . for to give effect to the residue would be to
disregard the expressed intent of the legislature. If by striking
out a void exception, proviso, or other restrictive clause, the remainder will have a broader scope as to subject or territory, its
operation is not in accord with the legislative intent." Comment
Statutes Unconstitutional in Part, Effect of Separability Clauses
(1929) 3 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 177, 180. See also Seigal, Severability
of Void Provision When Scope of Act is Changed Thereby (1938)
Wis. L. Rev. 534.
9. But where the proviso is objectionable because it is too narrow,
it may be broadened, thus limiting the scope of the statute. Note
(1942) 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1034.
10. Sheldon v. Hayne, 261 Ill. 222, 103 N.E. 1021 (1913); State v.
Gantz, 124 La. 535, 50 So. 524 (1909); Anderson v. Wood, 137
Tex. 201, 152 S.W. 1084 (1941); State ex rel. Brown v. Honey,
190 Wis. 285, 209 N.W. 591 (1926). Note (1942) 55 Harv. L. Rev.
1030.
11. This situation must be distinguished from that of a void exception to a statute of a civil nature, because of the constitutional
requirement that a crime be specifically defined. Daniel v. Larson, 157 Tenn. 690, 12 S.W. (2d) 386 (1928); State v. Gerhardt,
145 Ind. 439, 44 N.E. 469 (1896); State v. Crosson, 33 Idaho
140, 190 Pac. 922 (1920).
If the accused does not come within
the exception, the court may refuse to pass upon its possible
invalidity. Hammer v. State, 173 Ind. 199, 89 N.E. 850 (1909),
24 L. R. A. (N.S.) 795 (1910); McLendon v. State, 6 Ala. App.
19, 60 So. 406 (1912).
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of the act,12 or where the exception is especially broad.1s However,
only the exception is elided when the statute imposes a tax,14 or where
the force of practical considerations demand that as much as possible
of the act be preserved.' 5
When the legislatures began including separability clauses in statutes to insure their preservation, the courts paid lip-service only to
them.16 The only effect of such clause was to reverse the presumption
that all statutes are severable, so that such presumption is preserved
12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (imposing literacy
test to prevent negroes from voting); Yale & Gowne Manufacturing Co. v. Travis, 262 Fed. 576, aff'd, 252 U.S. 60 (1920) (providing exceptions from income tax for residents of state); Darnell
& Son Co. v. Memphis, 208 U.S. 113 (1908) (excepting residents of
state from a real and personal property tax); State v. Inland
Empire Refineries Inc., 3 Wash. (2d) 651, 100 P. (2d) 975 (1940)
(imposed tax on foreign refineries distributing products in the
state).
Connally v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902); Spraigue
v. Thompson, 118 U.S. 90 (1886); Winter v. Barett, 352 Ill. 441,
186 N.E. 113 (1933); Martin v. High Splint Coal Co., 286 Ky.
11, 103 S.W. (2d) 711 (1937).
The courts find little difficulty in broadening the scope of the
tax as to do otherwise would deprive the state of revenue. Board
of Comm. County of Johnson v. Johnson, 173 Ind. 76, 89 N.E. 590
(1909); Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal. 21, 248 Pac. 235
(1926), app. dis'd., 275 U.S. 507 (1927); Gulfport Building and
Loan Ass'n. v. Gulfport, 155 Miss. 498, 124 So. 658 (1929); State
ex rel. Dillon v .County Court, 60 W. Va. 339, 55 S.E. 382 (1906);
State ex rel. Belere v. Freer, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N.W. 673, app.
dis'd., 231 U.S. 616 (1914); Turner v. Fish, 19 Nev. 295, 9 Pac.
884 (1886) (limitation on public expenses). This is certain to
be the result where the exception in view of the entire act relieves
only a few from its effect. Farley v. Duluth, 150 Minn. 374, 185
N.W. 890 (1921); Smith v. Wilkins, 164 N.C. 135, 80 S.E. 168
(1913).
State ex rel. Monnett v. Baker, 50 Ohio 1, 44 N.E. 516 (1896) (if
whole statute had been declared void, the state's two largest cities
would have been without a government for two years); Board of
Comm. County of Elkhart v. Albright, 168 Ind. 564, 81 N.E. 578
(1907) (proviso provided for extra method of appeal from Superior Courts); Alumni Ass'n. of Delta Chapter of Zeta Psi Fraternity v. City of New Brunswick, -N.J.-,
26 At. (2d) 556
(1942), Faulk v. Buena Vista Burial Park Ass'n, 152 S.W. (2d)
891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
See Kapaun v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 64 S.D. 635, 638,
269 N.W. 564, 566 (1936). "The act in question contains a 'savings clause,' which it seems customary nowadays to insert in all
legislation with the apparent hope that it may work some not
quite understood magic." State v. Inland Empire Refineries Inc.,
3 Wash. (2d) 651, 101 P. (2d) 976 (1940) (stated a separability
clause should be disregarded where effect would be to broaden
scope of act); State v. Neveau, 237 Wis. 85, 96, 294 N.W. 796, 802
(1940) (declared that legislature cannot insert " . . . an all inclusive severability clause, authorize the court to whittle down the
law so as to bring it within the constitutional field.") Daniel v.
Larson, 157 Tenn. 690, 12 S.W. (2d) 286 (1928) (ignored separability clause and held entire act void); Stern, Separability and
Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court (1937) 51 Harv. L.
Rev. 76, 128.
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only when a separability clause is included.17 By the theory of "legislative intent" it appears that the courts should look no further than
the separability clause.28 This would, however, prove impractical as
the courts cannot be expected to make into a constitutional statute
whatever the legislature passes, and the separability clause may have
been meant to apply only to one possibly invalid provision, whereas
the problem of separability may arise in connection with several other
provisions. The court should therefore, further employ the device
of "legislative intent" to determine whether the separability clause
was meant to apply to the exemption in question, or whether the
statute would have been enacted without the exemption. 19 The court
may properly look to the history of the bill.20 In the principal case,
the exemption as a mechanical matter was easily elided, 21 and the
fact that neither the exemption nor the separability clause was in the
bill as originally presented, but were both added at a later and the
same time, clearly indicates that the clause was meant to apply to
the exemption.22 In such case the court need construe no more, and
should give full effect to the presumption of separability, 2 although
24
the operation of the act is thereby extended.
17.

See Note 16, supra. Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. McCormack, 174 Tenn. 827, 125 S.W. (2d) 151 (1939) (declared act
entirely void on basis that legislature did not intend it to be severable because no severability clause had been included); see Utah
Power and Light v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 184 (1932).
18. A separability clause seems to say, "We are not sure of the constitutionality of this act, but have passed what we believe is a
valid statute. But if you (the court) should determine that any
part of the act renders it unconstitutional we hereby expressly
state that we intend the act to stand, and that to do so we
desire that the objectionable portions should be elided."
19. Horack, In the Name of Legislative Intention (1932) 38 W. Va.

L. Q. 119, 127.

20. State v. Sanlee, 111 Iowa 1, 82 N.W. 445 (1900); Commonwealth
v. Hatfield Coal Co., 186 Ky. 411, 217 S.W. 125 (1919); Fitger
Co. v. Dremer, 199 Wis. 338, 226 N.W. 310 (1929); see Frost v.
Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 525, 527 (1929).
21. point
An objectionable
exception is ideal from the mechanical viewfor separation.
Turner v. Fish, 19 Nev. 295, 9 Pac. 884
(1886); People's Bank of Rock Hill v. People's Bank of Anderson,
122 S.C. 476, 115 S.E. 736 (1923); Faulk v. Buena Vista Burial
Park Ass'n., 152 S.W. (2d) 891 (Tex. Civ. App., 1941); Netha v.
Spokane Co., 35 Wash. 26, 76 Pac. 521 (1904).
22. The objection against judicial legislation is thus met. See note 5,
supra; Note (1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 626.
23. People v. Henry, 131 Cal. App. 82, 21 P. (2d) 672 (1933); Bacon
Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal. 21, 248 Pac. 235 (1926), app. dis'd.,
275 U.S. 507 (1927); Weco Products v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis.
474, 274 N.W. 426 (1937); Standard Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 112
Ore. 314, 228 Pac. 812 (1924); accord, Albert v. Milk Control
Board, 210 Ind. 283, 200 N.E. 688 (1936); Miller National Life
Insurance Co. v. American State Bank, 206 Ind. 511, 190 N.E.
433 (1933); Ex parte Schuler, 167 Cal. 282, 139 Pac. 685 (1914)
(first case to base decision on separability clause); State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Tittmann, 42 N.M. 76, 75 P. (2d) 701 (1938).
24. The law of Indiana by the doctrine of the principal case appears
to be that where elision of the exception would broaden the scope
of the act, the entire act must be declared invalid, with the possible exceptions considered in notes 12 and 13, supra.

